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INTRODUCTION
Numerous empirical studies on the determinants of growth in transition econo-
mies (for example, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb [1996]; Havrylyshyn [2001]; Havrylyshyn,
Izvorkski, and van Rooden [1998]; Havrylyshyn and van Rooden [2000]; and Berg et al.
[1999]) aim at explaining the major differences in growth performance among these
countries. The standard question, by now, is to ask what are the relative roles of
initial conditions, policies, and institutions? No real consensus has emerged, at least
partially because such, in principle, alternative explanations are, in practice, inter-
twined and endogenous. Most researchers converge towards a view that, while initial
conditions dominate as the explanation during early transition years, over time poli-
cies become more important, though not always compensating for adverse initial con-
ditions. Partially reflecting recent growth discussions [Easterly, 2001; de Soto, 2000],
the role—positive or not—of institutions is now unanimously emphasized. At the same
time, it is admitted that institutional development itself can not be easily measured or
explained, making using it as an explanatory variable somewhat problematic. One
does not like using a key explanatory variable that cannot itself be explained.
One standard recommendation for transition and developing economies is that
they enhance the development of financial markets. Kenneth Rogoff, the Economic
Councillor and Director of Research Department of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) writes of probably the most successful economy of recent times that “to con-
tinue such stellar economic performance…China will eventually require a world-class
capital market” [Rogoff, 2003]. The relationship between financial markets and eco-
nomic growth has been studied for the cases of developing economies, but it has been
largely ignored in the cases of transition economies, perhaps because of the inevitable
lack of longer time-series for analysis. There has been debate on the sequencing of
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the relative merits of different financial systems, often dubbed the Continental (or
bank-based) and the Anglo-American (or the markets-based) models. It has not been
debated, though, whether countries should aim at one or another of two possible
wider goals. One goal is to develop a set of as meaningfully large financial markets as
possible. The second is to concentrate on improving the efficiency of any markets that
one may have at a given time, whether they exist by design or by default. Although
these two goals may seem to be two goods both of which one should have, in practice
they may, to a degree, be alternatives. Obviously, to be efficient, markets need to
exceed some minimal size, but beyond that threshold there are alternatives. This is
especially so in the intriguing case—to be discussed below using the example of the
three Baltic States—of a country that has the possibility of “borrowing” existing for-
eign markets. This example of borrowing foreign institutions is another aspect of
what has been much debated in legal literature as “legal transplants”.
The distinction should be kept separate from another recently debated issue. When
Stiglitz [2002] and Rogoff [2003] debate the pros and cons of capital account liberaliza-
tion, the argument is easily seen in terms of controlled and market-based develop-
ment strategies. Stiglitz [2002], arguing against (at least early) liberalization, pro-
poses state controls and thus fewer markets, whereas Rogoff [2003] sees a full set of
markets as an inevitable goal—at least at some development phase. In light of such
debates, the view proposed here is perhaps paradoxical. We argue that the Baltic
Development Path of deep integration based on early and complete liberalization will
lead to fewer domestic markets. This will—at least in the peculiar Baltic circum-
stances—not prevent, and might well promote, relatively fast growth through speedy
structural change. Also, it facilitates a macroeconomic regime that is usually viewed
as being inherently contradictory and unstable.
Though there were early proposals that transition economies import institutions
wholesale, such as small European countries adopting Dutch legislation, there is only
one case of a (former) country adopting foreign legislation and institutions almost
overnight. This is the case of the German reunification, which few would now regard
a success story. More generally, the conditionality imposed by the European Union
(EU) accession process could well be seen as a case of importing institutions. This
process and the act of importing financial credibility by selling the domestic banking
system to foreigners are usually regarded as success stories. Below, we discuss Esto-
nia, (and also partially, at least by implication) Latvia, and Lithuania, as an extreme
case of the possibility of thriving by borrowing foreign markets. One potentially impor-
tant question that this discussion raises is whether the conclusions could be used for
developing financial systems in different kinds of economies. Is, for instance, the Bal-
tic experience applicable to Russia? First, however, we must discuss the more general
relation between financial development and growth in transition economies.
To our knowledge, Drakos’ [2003] paper on the effects on economic performance
of the banking sector’s structure is the only study that empirically tests the relation-
ship between financial markets and economic growth in transition countries. No study
specifically assesses the roles of the size and efficiency of domestic financial markets
on economic growth in transition countries. This paper is a second modest attempt to
start to rectify this gap in the literature.1267 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
In transition countries, the link between financial sector development and
economic growth in transition economies seems to be ambiguous, at best [Krkoska,
2001; Berglöf and Roland, 1995; Berglöf and Bolton, 2002]. There does not seem to be
a direct causality from financial development to growth. Most investment in transi-
tion countries has been financed by retained earnings. Foreign direct and other invest-
ment has often substituted for domestic financing. Domestic saving rates have been
depressed due to declining statistical incomes and much improved availability of con-
sumer goods, while financial intermediation has left much to be desired. Even in
Central Europe, where financial sectors tend to be better developed than in Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, banks have sometimes concentrated on
financing the chronic deficits of the public sector. The level of loans granted to the
private sector remains considerably lower than the EU average. For these reasons,
one might easily infer that emerging domestic financial sectors have only modestly, if
at all, affected economic growth in transition countries.
This would seem to conflict with existing international experience. Over the
past decade, much interest has been focused on the link between financial develop-
ment and economic growth. Since the late 1980s, endogenous growth theory has sug-
gested new theories exploring the link. Pagano [1993] explains three ways in which
financial development might affect economic growth under the basic endogenous growth
model. First, it can increase the productivity of investments. Second, an efficient
financial sector reduces transaction costs and thus increases the share of savings
channeled into productive investments. Third, financial sector development—or lack
of it—can either promote or depress savings.
Empirical literature on the growth-finance nexus has also expanded much. Most
empirical studies using cross-country and/or panel analysis conclude that financial
development accelerates economic growth [Levine, 1997; Thiel, 2001; Wachtel, 2001).
A few time-series analyses, however, contradict this finding [Demetriades and Hussein,
1996; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Shan, Morris, and Sun, 2001]. Both the method
and the data set used seem to affect the results. Studies that use large bodies of data
from both rich and poor countries normally find a causal relationship running from
financial market development to economic growth. Studies of smaller groups of rela-
tively homogenous countries often show quite opposite results. The starting point of
this paper is that these differences may be explained by the fact that most studies use
the size of the financial sector as the measure of development of the sector. Size,
however, cannot be the whole story. It does not necessarily capture the effect that
financial sector efficiency might have on economic growth. If efficiency, not size, were
to matter, a positive finance-growth relationship would only be found when the size of
the financial sector is correlated with the efficiency of the sector. For data covering
both high- and low-income countries, it is to be expected that high-income countries
have both larger and more efficient financial sectors than low- or middle-income coun-
tries. In this case, the size of the financial sector thus correlates both with efficiency
and income levels. Very small financial markets, often found in poor countries, simply
cannot be efficient. If, on the other hand, one studies countries with similar income
levels, the size of the sector itself tells nothing about qualitative differences among
countries. Measuring size, therefore, only measures size, and any efficiency differences268 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
are ignored. No causality running from financial development to economic growth is
found and the financial sector does not seem to contribute to economic growth. As we
just argued, however, this result is based on a questionable premise.
In this study, we attempt to avoid this problem by two means. We link the empiri-
cal test more closely than usually with the relevant theoretical models. Also, we use
variables that measure both qualitative and quantitative financial sector development.
The margin between lending and deposit interest rates measures the qualitative devel-
opment in the sector. To our knowledge, this variable has not been used previously to
measure the efficiency of the banking sector when studying the growth-finance nexus,
but it is closely linked to the theoretical model by Blackburn and Hung [1998]. They
identify a two-way causal relationship between growth and financial development. In
their model, the lack of a financial sector means that every investor must individually
monitor projects, so that the costs of monitoring are excessive. With a well-developed
financial sector, monitoring tasks are delegated to intermediaries. Transaction costs
are reduced and more savings can be allotted to investments that produce new tech-
nology. Ultimately, this promotes economic growth. Blackburn and Hung [1998] also
show how a country might become trapped in a vicious cycle of sluggish economic
growth and weak financial development. This situation occurs when the initial level of
technical development in the country is very poor and the expected flow of new tech-
nology remains low. Monitoring costs remain so high that financial intermediation is
never organized. As a result, transaction costs remain high and economic growth
remains low.
Following the earlier studies, our second variable is linked to the size of the finan-
cial sector. We measure the quantitative development by the amount of bank credit
allocated to the private sector as a share of the production in the private sector. We
analyze the finance-growth nexus using a fixed-effects panel model and unbalanced
panel data from 25 transition countries during 1993-2001. Our findings support the
view that the presence of an efficient banking sector accelerates economic growth in
transition economies. Moreover, the interest rate margin is significantly and nega-
tively related to economic growth. This finding parallels theories suggesting that
greater efficiency in the banking sector accelerates economic growth. Indeed, as banking
sector reforms and the interest rate margin are negatively correlated, it has signifi-
cant policy implications.2 Countries with evolved banking sectors have smaller inter-
est margins and higher economic growth than countries struggling with banking sec-
tor reform.
The relationship between the amount of credit to the private sector (the second
variable) and economic growth is less clear. Our results indicate that when lagged one
year, a higher amount of credit is negatively linked to GDP growth. The relationship
between the current amount of credit and economic growth is not statistically signifi-
cant, however. This outcome contradicts the general literature, but is in line with
financial market development in transition countries. A couple characteristics of tran-
sition economies should be noted. First, banking crises rocked the financial sectors of
many countries during the first decade of transition. Thus, large amounts of credit
could have led to significant drops in GDP growth. Second, our findings probably reflect
the soft budget constraints still prevalent in many transition countries. Their existence
may have encouraged private sector actors to make counterproductive investments.269 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
Given this, it is clear that a large banking sector in itself does not necessarily promote
high economic growth. Overall, we can argue that the size of the financial sector is not
a good variable to measure the development of effectiveness in the sector in transition
countries.
The lack of comparable information on equity and debt markets means that
they cannot be analyzed here. Since they have yet to become significant channels for
financing in transition countries, however, the overall picture of the relation between
the financial sector and economic growth in transition countries should not be seri-
ously biased by their absence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data used
in this study, while section 3 summarizes the empirical results. Section 4 examines
the empirical case of Estonia, which would seem to support our results, even in a
somewhat extreme form. Section 5 asks what our results might mean for further
reform in Russia, a country in which the small size of the financial system is widely
seen as a major problem. Section 6 concludes.
DATA
We analyze the link between efficiency and size of the banking sector and eco-
nomic growth using panel data for 25 transition countries during the period 1993-2001
(see Appendix 1 for the list of countries). The short time period is unfortunate, but
inevitable. We measure economic development in terms of annual real GDP growth.
As noted, development of the financial sector is difficult to measure, but we attempt to
get beyond earlier studies that only measure development with a variable for size of
the financial sector. Size does not necessarily reflect efficiency, so the growth of the
financial sector may not indicate development.
We look at both qualitative and quantitative development of the financial sector.
To measure the qualitative effectiveness of the sector, we use the interest rate mar-
gin (INT). INT measures the difference between deposit and lending rates in the
banking market. The margin is likely a good estimator for efficiency in the banking
sector as it describes transaction costs within the sector. If the margin declines due to
lower transaction costs, the share of savings going to investments increases. As growth
is positively linked to investment, a decrease in transaction costs should accelerate
economic growth. This variable is closely linked to the theoretical model of Blackburn
and Hung [1998]. The interest rate margin may in some cases also reflect an improve-
ment in the quality of borrowers in the economy. As those improvements are often
linked to favorable economic development, however, we attempt to eliminate the
problem with control variables for economic growth in the regression. We use inter-
est rate margins from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Transition Reports.3
Our second variable, CREDIT, is similar to the variables that have been used
in earlier studies. CREDIT measures the size of the banking sector by dividing the
banks’ claims on the private sector by the production of the private sector. The data
come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Many earlier studies have
used the amount of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP as a measure for the
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the small share of the private sector could restrict the amount of the credit to the
private sector as a share of GDP. Despite the drawbacks of CREDIT discussed above,
it still appears a superior option to the pure ratio of broad money to GDP used in some
studies because it excludes credits by development banks and loans to the govern-
ment and public enterprises. CREDIT also enables us to compare the results with
previous studies.
We use a number of control variables to control for other factors that influence
economic growth. The reform index (RI) consists of five indices published by the EBRD.
These indices measure large-scale and small-scale privatization, price liberalization,
foreign exchange (forex) and trade liberalization, and competition policy. For each
country, we use a simple average of these indices for each year. The bigger the index
is for a country, the more advanced it is in regard to the reforms in the five areas. Due
to the nature of the reforms, their effects on the economy can be seen with a lag of one
or two years. We use a one-year-lagged reform index in this study. Inflation (INF) is
measured by using the end-of-period consumer price index. A number of studies have
found significant effects of inflation and reforms on economic growth in transition
countries [De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1996; Havrylyshyn, Izvorkski, and van Rooden,
1998; Berg et al., 1999; Grogan and Moers, 2001].
In addition to macroeconomic variables and variables representing structural reforms,
the initial conditions at the beginning of transition also determine later economic
development [De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1996; Havrylyshyn, Izvorkski, and van
Rooden, 1998; Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2000]. Here, however, we leave out ini-
tial conditions as control variables. In a fixed-effects model, the initial conditions should
be contained in the individual dummies. Moreover, our research period begins in
1993, when the effects of initial conditions were already, to a degree, at least waning.
Table 1 provides a summary statistics of the variables.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics 1992-2001
Variable Period Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs.
INT, % 1992-2001 32.29 10.8 1898.4 –15 143.40 206
INT,a % 1992-2001 15.22 10.4 77.9 –0.3 13.46 190
CREDIT, % 1992-2001 37.05 25.87 506.87 0.57 45.31 198
RI 1992-2000 2.76 3 3.8 1 0.72 225
INF, % 1992-2001 441.8 19.8 10896 –7.6 1432.1 250
Real GDP growth, % 1993-2001 0.9 3.3 17.6 –31.2 7.7 225
a. Sixteen outliers have been removed from the data (Bulgaria 1996, banking crisis; Croatia and FYR
Macedonia 1992, profound instability in the area; Azerbaijan 1992-1994; Russia 1995-1996; Tajikistan
1995-1998; Turkmenistan 1992-1995; and Ukraine 1992, probable disturbances in the data).
ESTIMATION RESULTS
To analyze the finance-growth nexus, we use a fixed-effects panel model. This
choice is reasonable, as our data consists of almost the entire population of transition
economies. Wachtel [2001] criticizes the use of a country fixed-effects model to deter-
mine causality between financial sector development and economic growth. In his
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financial sectors are larger among countries than over time. This is not normally the
case in transition economies, however. Banking sectors developed quickly and the
level of financial development changes substantially over time. We thus estimate the
following regression:
(1) GROWTHi,t = β0,i + β1
'FINANCE + β2
'[CONDITIONINGSET] + ui,t ,
where the dependent variable, GROWTH, equals real GDP growth, β0,i is the indi-
vidual dummy for each country (constant in time), FINANCE equals either INT or
CREDIT and CONDITIONINGSET represents a vector of conditioning information
that controls for other factors associated with economic growth. The error term is ui,t.
TABLE 2
Link between the Financial Sector and Growth:
Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions
restricted sample
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
RI-1 1.554 2.453 5.222*** –1.840
(2.160) (1.882) (1.887) (1.256)
INF –0.001*** –0.001** –0.001* –0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
INF-1 –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.001 –0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
INT –0.062*** –0.052*** –0.212***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029)






Number of Countries 22 25 22 25
Number of Observations 154 180 176 165
R2 0.56 0.56 0.47 0.63
WALD 1 5,310*** 490*** 100.6*** 2,336***
AR(1) 1.733 2.470** 0.992 1.473
Standard deviations in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and *** at the 1 percent level.
Results from the panel estimations are presented in Table 2. Note that a shrink-
ing interest rate margin (measure of efficiency of the financial sector) promotes eco-
nomic growth. In contrast to many earlier studies, the amount of credit does not seem
to accelerate economic growth. Among the control variables, the reform index seems
to have the expected positive sign in three out of four regressions and the coefficient
is significant only in one case. This result is somewhat different from most earlier
results and seems to be due to our data set. Our data set is constrained in the first half
of the 1990s to include only the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Baltic coun-
tries, as we do not have financial data for many CIS countries for those years. In
addition, INT might catch a part of the effect of the reforms on economic growth. As
expected, inflation affects GDP growth negatively. Following the results of the earlier
studies, inflation is significantly related to growth.272 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In the first regression, we have both variables for the financial sector with their
current and lagged values. As expected, both the current and the lagged interest rate
margins are negatively and significantly associated with growth. The results do not
change significantly when the credit variable is dropped in the second regression. The
absolute values of the coefficients of INT get smaller but, according to our tests, this
is due to a larger sample of countries available in the second regression. We test the
significance of the interest rate margin by leaving out several outliers (regression 4).
Also in this case, the margin is negatively linked with economic growth. These results
are in line with theory presented in Blackburn and Hung [1998], that is, an efficient
banking sector decreases transaction costs and the margin between lending and de-
posit rates. The share of savings allocated to investments increases and, according to
the endogenous growth theory, leads to higher economic growth.
The amount of credit allocated to the private sector is insignificantly associated
with economic growth. In stark contrast to earlier studies, the lagged value of CREDIT
has a negative coefficient. In fact, our results are quite in line with our earlier thoughts
about using the size of the financial sector as a measure of financial development. In
transition countries, the size of the financial sector is not an indicator of the quality of
the sector. For example, soft budget constraints are prevalent in many transition
countries and lending to enterprises applying soft budget constraints may have resulted
in counterproductive investments and financial losses. According to Mitchell [2002],
banks may even make the situation worse by keeping such loans on their balance
sheets. As a result, growth in credit has not been profitable. Another phenomenon
linked to the negative coefficient may be a number of banking crises that transition
countries experienced in the 1990s. Unsustainable credit growth precipitated banking
crises that hurt transition economies [Tang, Zoli, and Klytchnikova, 2000]. Thus, the
size of the sector does not correlate with the qualitative development of the financial
sector in transition countries.
We checked the robustness of our results with additional control variables in the
regressions. The growth rate in OECD countries has a positive and significant impact
on growth in transition countries. Including the OECD growth rate into the model
does not affect the coefficient or significance of INT and CREDIT. None of the other
control variables—government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, share of exports
as a percentage of GDP, gross domestic investments as a percentage of GDP—has any
significant effect on INT or CREDIT.
We checked the causality between financial sector development and GDP by
using a Granger causality test. According to those results, causality runs from finan-
cial sector development to GDP growth regardless of whether we are using interest
rate margin or the amount of credit to the private sector as a measure for financial
development. In addition, the causality seems to be working both ways as interest
rate margin and the amount of credit are affected by GDP growth, although the coef-
ficients in this direction are relatively small. Overall, this two-way causality fits with
the theoretical model of Blackburn and Hung [1998].273 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
AN EMPIRICAL CASE: ESTONIA
The previous section argued that it is not the size, but the efficiency, of the finan-
cial system that contributes to economic growth. Though new, these results are theo-
retically robust and also—at least on second thought—in line with everyday thinking.
Nevertheless, empirical economic research quite often produces results that, while in
line with some theoretical framework and also intrinsically believable, would, for
instance, be a seriously faulty guideline for policy reform. It is always advisable, there-
fore, to perform a simple reality check: can we tell a credible real-life story that cor-
roborates our findings? The story we choose here is that of Estonia, the smallest of
the three Baltic States now entering both NATO and the EU.4
On the political economy level, Estonia has succeeded in escaping from the USSR
to the Euro-Atlantic unions in just more than ten years. Economically, it has grown by
an average annual rate of 2.9 percent in 1993-2002, in spite of having to change not
only its economic and political system, but also its production structure and trade
orientation—all the while building an independent state. In 1991, at least 95 percent
of its export trade was with the USSR. By the late 1990s, this share was down to less
than 20 percent and by 2002 the share had shrunk to 3 percent. Growth in 1997-2002
averaged 5.3 percent annually and is widely expected to continue by 5-6 percent annu-
ally. Estonia was also able to close its privatization office in late 2001: almost every-
thing had been privatized. Crucially for our discussion, the country has been able to
combine, since the summer of 1992, a fixed (and unchanged) exchange rate, total and
fast financial liberalization before appropriate supervision was in place, and very large
current account deficits, usually fluctuating between 5 and 12 percent of GDP. This
should be an impossible economic triad, but Estonia (as well as Latvia and Lithuania)
is an important exception to that rule. This has to be explained, and the explanation
fits well with our analysis above.
One has to start with the history to understand the choices Estonians made in
1989-92. The Baltic countries never joined the USSR willingly, they were annexed. As
soon as the opportunity emerged, they aimed at restoring their independence. As the
prevailing expectations of Russian developments were gloomy, and given the political
uncertainties created by the large non-Estonian resident population, it was estimated
that independence could only be safeguarded by distancing oneself as fast from the
post-Soviet space as possible. This could only be done by rapid and deep integration
with Northern-Western Europe. In spite of their celebrated patriotism, which was
defensive in character, Estonians consequently never focused on establishing a full-
fledged national economy with a complete set of markets. Their defense against an
uncertain future was not to develop a full range of institutions, but rather to borrow
the appropriate institutions, which could be found ready-made in geographical and
cultural proximity in Northern-Western Europe.5 The goal was, fundamentally, to
become a region inside a wider geographical entity. Furthermore, it was felt that the
small size of the country would make developing a full set of markets impracticable.
Indeed, as a consequence of borrowing and deep integration, Estonia has a broad set of
institutions in use, but few genuinely Estonian institutions.274 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Becoming a region rather than a full-fledged national economy implied that,
like most regions in most countries, Estonia quickly abolished practically all barriers
of movement of factors of production, which included the liberalization of both the
current and the capital account. Liberalization took just a couple of years and was one
of the most complete in the world. Neither did Estonia develop an independent, “national”
set of property rights. Most important property was sold to foreign strategic investors
at prices that did not maximize fiscal revenue. Instead, more emphasis was put on
investment plans, access to markets, and inflow of managerial skills. After a couple
visible banking crises, the banking and other financial industries were sold to foreign
owners (mostly Swedish but also Finnish).
Estonia did not develop large financial markets. In fact, equity markets are
moribund, and the stock exchange has been taken over by a foreign strategic partner.
The existing public debt, which accounts for about 5 percent of GDP, is owned by
development banks and is not marketable; therefore, there are no markets for gov-
ernment debt. Estonia inherited zero Soviet debt and has followed highly prudent
fiscal policies. A market for the Estonian kroon exists in principle, but few potential
speculators would have even an investment limit for such a small currency of a highly
successful country. Sunk entry costs would be meaningful, and thus a barrier to specu-
lation. Also, there is no interbank market, as free entry of Estonian banks to deutsche
mark markets (to which the kroon was tied before the euro) was legislated early on.
Few speculators would ever have placed their monies with Estonian banks, and the
banking crises experienced proved them right. After macroeconomic and institutional
stabilization and as banks have been sold to foreigners, Estonian banks are secure
institutions, but interest rates are also low.
In current macroeconomic vocabulary, Estonia has been successful because
fundamentals have been sound and policies credible. To put it otherwise and perhaps
somewhat provocatively, Estonia (and Latvia and Lithuania) has succeeded in combin-
ing the three incompatibles—fixed exchange rates, full liberalization, and large cur-
rent account deficits—because it has abolished financial markets. There is very little
room for speculation as there are hardly any assets that a speculator could use. This
is partially due to design, as explained above, but it is also partially by default (for
instance, the banking crises were hardly planned). In fact, in 1997 Estonia seemed to
be in danger of entering a more normal transition economy path. There was the
beginning of an asset bubble, but the authorities and finally the Russian crisis of 1998
succeeded in preventing its growth.
The small size of the domestic financial market has not prevented the growth,
opening up, and modernization of the economy. To the contrary, highly suitable condi-
tions have been created for foreign direct and other investment. Most foreign invest-
ment was never directly privatization-related, as the method chosen did not maximize
fiscal revenue, but privatization to foreigners did create a long-term bond between
Estonian entities and foreign owners. This is now visible in the rapid growth of “other
investment” in the capital account, which is basically bank credit, more often extended
by foreign owners to their Estonian entities. Though this is recorded as short-term
capital in statistics, there is really little reason to think that such investment would
be any less volatile than foreign direct investment.275 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
Estonian financial markets are small, but are they efficient? Obviously, the
very small Tallinn stock exchange is not technically efficient, but people have access
to other, efficient markets (aided by computer and Internet access). The foreign-owned
banking sector is efficient, and has brought the interest rate margin down from 8.7
percentage points in 1994 to 2.1 percentage points in 2000.
Like other development paths, this one is not without its risks. Southern Italy
took a somewhat similar path almost one and a half centuries ago. For reasons still
not quite understood, the problem of the mezzogiorno has remained ever since.6 Ger-
many took a similar path with re-unification, but the problem of the Eastern Länder
was created immediately, as pay rises in the East failed to take any account of produc-
tivity differences.7 Obviously, regions do not really face a balance of payments con-
straint, but they do have a competitiveness constraint. As long as Estonia still has a
sovereign currency, speculation remains possible. Lack of markets abolishes the
grounds for some kinds of speculation, but the classical case of domestic exporters not
repatriating export revenue always remains possible. Also, lacking the possibility of
very large inward transfers, regions have a fiscal constraint and they do face the
possibility of a two-tier financial system. In transition economies as elsewhere, small-
and medium-sized companies perceive a financing constraint [Klapper, Sarria-Allende,
and Sulla, 2002]. Foreign-owned banks may well be particularly apt to cream-skinning
and be passive in serving the needs of poorer households and small upstart compa-
nies, especially away from capital cities. The possible damage to the domestic savings
ratio may not be fatal, if foreign savings are indeed available, but the risk of insuffi-
cient small enterprise finance may be more serious. Opinion diverges on whether this
is a true problem in the Baltic countries. Furthermore, foreign-owned banks, if rais-
ing their finance from abroad, may well end up having currency mismatches that are
difficult to manage. This proved a major problem in Argentina. Finally, as long as,
say, pension funds have formal or informal constraints on their choice of portfolio,
undersupply of domestic assets may be a major problem. In countries like the Baltics,
however, such constraints should be difficult to justify.
RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC PATH
We can characterize a Baltic Development Path thus. It is based on such deep
integration that a country does not aim at developing a full set of markets and institu-
tions, but instead creates, by full liberalization, access to markets and institutions
available in geographical proximity. In this way a country does not so much create
institutions as borrow them. Obviously, this path was not available to all transition
economies. This may have been the case for a number of reasons, including national-
ist thinking, misplaced advice, and a lack of suitable neighbors to join. It seems incon-
ceivable, therefore, that a country like Russia would engage in deep integration. Some
aspects of it, like the adoption of a currency board, have been proposed especially in
crisis situations, but with scant prospects of political acceptability. Judging the extreme
case of the Baltic Development Path as being unavailable to Russia, we may still ask
whether, in light of the discussion above, Russia should aim at a large or an efficient
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is available, as the threshold size of potentially efficient markets has not yet been
passed?
Russia’s market economy has a number of specific characteristics [Komulainen et
al., 2003]. The ownership of key companies is largely concentrated in a small number
of multibranch conglomerates dominated by the so-called oligarchs. In 2000, govern-
ment-controlled enterprises (mainly gas and electricity), accounted for 43 percent of
total sales of the 64 largest Russian companies, with combined sales of about 42 per-
cent of the Russian GDP [Barnard and Thomsen, 2002]. Eighty-five percent of private
sales were by enterprises controlled by only eight conglomerates, all based in the
primary commodities sector. As one would expect in such an oligarchic society, eco-
nomic and political decision making remain closely connected, especially in the regions.
Enterprise success is often more dependent on building relational capital with the
authorities than on investing in efficiency [Gaddy and Ickes, 2002]. Finance is reallo-
cated inside the conglomerates, perhaps even more so after the 1998 crisis than be-
fore it [Perotti and Gelfer, 2002], but that tends to constrain even further the avail-
ability of finance for non-oligarchic companies. There is little reason to think that
financial reallocation inside conglomerates would be as rational as that intermediated
by efficient markets.
Structurally, the Russian economy remains dependent on oil and other raw mate-
rial production [Rautava, 2002]. Most initial GDP growth since 1998 was in the energy
sector, including related transport and trading activities. Though consumption growth
has accounted for about two-thirds of GDP growth since 2000, most investment growth
has still been in the oils and metals sectors. Elsewhere, investment has stagnated or
even declined. Exports, excluding oil and metals, have not only remained very low but
have actually declined.
This connects with an underdeveloped financial system in which there is rela-
tively little monetization. In 2001, the M2/GDP ratio was 24 percent in Russia, 71
percent in the Czech Republic and 43 percent in Poland. There is no system for chan-
neling domestic and foreign savings into investment, no risk-management instru-
ments, and few ways for new private enterprises to raise capital. The existing banking
sector is inefficient. Although the margin between lending and deposit rates has dropped
significantly since 1995, it was still 11 percentage points in 2001. This means that
bank credits are expensive. As a result, nearly all investment is financed from retained
earnings. Only 3 to 4 percent of financing comes in the form of bank loans, and almost
nothing from initial public offerings. The ratio of bonds outstanding to GDP was just 3
percent in 2001, compared with 15 percent in the Czech Republic and 20 percent in
Poland. Dependence on retained earnings is typical of transition economies [Krkoska,
2002], but the Russian case is extreme. Higher growth requires more investment, and
investment requires financial intermediation.8 Recently, the Russian investment ratio
has fluctuated around 17 percent of GDP. High-growth scenarios assume a ratio of 25
to 30 percent [Komulainen et al., 2003]. The constraint is not in low savings. Actually,
though saving-investment statistics cannot be reliable in a dollarized, largely cash-
based economy, Russia has been a high-savings economy with a savings ratio of 25 to
30 percent of GDP. Of this, roughly 10 percent of GDP has been channeled abroad.
Most telling, perhaps, is the relative scarcity of small- and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs). A major World Bank [2002a] study concludes that SMEs must reach a277 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
threshold of 40 percent of total employment to become the engine of national eco-
nomic growth. In Russia, this share has stagnated at 20 percent or less. The expan-
sion of new enterprises would increase if bank loans were available.9 Given this situ-
ation, it is indeed strange that until very recently a strong block of Russian opinion
held that post-1999 growth proved that Russia does not really need financial inter-
mediation, because investment financed from retained earnings or transfers inside major
multi-industry conglomerates was sufficient. Of course, this view neatly ignores the
corollary that most of Russia’s industrial investment is either in, or adjunct to, the
energy sector, which tends, therefore, to freeze Russia’s traditional production structure.
The Russian banking sector remains small and affords little potential for financial
intermediation. Total sector assets amount to just $103 billion, or about 35 percent of
GDP. Corresponding figures are over 100 percent for the Czech Republic, over 70
percent for Estonia, and about 60 percent for Poland. Lending to the private sector is
also modest: about 15 percent of GDP. Moreover, the short maturities of most bank
liabilities limit credit expansion.
One reason why Russian banks offer little credit is the maturity mismatch between
their liabilities and potential assets. With the exception of Sberbank, banks have liabili-
ties of very short maturities, often corporate currency savings with a maturity of just
a month or so. This may change slowly, as deposit insurance is gradually widened, but
it emphasizes the need to develop new financial instruments—new markets—so that
even banks could engage in meaningful amounts of financial intermediation.
Thus, while other economic reforms have moved ahead recently, there is a con-
spicuous absence of banking reform. Russian banks can still use accounting standards
that do not accurately portray asset quality. Because of low minimum capital require-
ments, Russia still has over 1,300 banks, which hinders efficient banking supervision.
In addition, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) operates both as banking supervisor and
owner of major banks. For example, Sberbank holds almost 70 percent of household
deposits, is majority owned by the CBR, and deposits are state guaranteed. There is
little foreign investment in the sector.
Most observers generally agree on the list of needed reforms,10 including the
implementation of higher minimum capital requirements, the use of internationally
accepted accounting standards and practices, improvements in banking supervision,
clarification of the role of state banks, and introduction of a guarantee for retail depos-
its. Opinions differ on the possible speed of progress. The CBR has embraced banking
reform, while emphasizing that excessive speed might endanger financial stability.
More stringent banking supervision, international accounting standards, and a higher
minimum capital requirement should be in place by 2004, as well as a deposit guaran-
tee by 2005. Meanwhile, markets will closely follow the handling of state banks’ ownership.
Russian banks have recently begun to show improved performance. Total banking
assets, aggregate bank capital, and lending to the private sector now exceed pre-crisis
levels. At the end of the third quarter of 2002, household bank deposits were in real
terms a third bigger than a year earlier. Enterprise deposits declined, however, possi-
bly reflecting declining enterprise profitability. At the same time, the stock of credit
extended to households increased by 40 percent, and enterprise credits by a quarter.
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credit expansion, the worry of the CBR on deficient supervision is fully understand-
able.
Russian equity and bond markets have also shown clear signs of recovery. Between
January 2001 and May 2002, equity markets rose 180 percent (then declined some-
what). During the post-crisis period (specifically, since December 2000), 14 large enter-
prises and banks, the city of Moscow, and Yamalo-Nenetsk region successfully issued
new international bonds [Troika Dialog, 2002]. Although these developments do not
represent large-scale capital inflows, they demonstrate improvements in investor sen-
timent and greater functionality of Russian financial markets.
Financial markets not only enable enterprises to acquire capital, they also create
possibilities to diversify ownership of Russian enterprises. This is particularly impor-
tant since many Russian enterprises are still owned by their managers and employ-
ees, that is, there is no participation of outside capital or know-how. Access to finan-
cial markets is no longer limited to the very largest raw materials and energy compa-
nies. The next echelon of enterprises can now get access, as shown by the NYSE
listing of a foodstuff enterprise, Wimm Bill Dann, in February 2002, which resulted in
23 percent of the enterprise being sold to foreign investors. This represents a continu-
ation of a trend of listing and selling partial stakes in Russian enterprises to outside
investors that began in 1996-97, but was interrupted by the 1998 crisis.
In the end, growth is generated by enterprises, where corporate control plays a
key role. How keen Russian managers and owners really are to opening up enterprise
ownership remains to be seen. Russia has experienced several instances of abuse of
minority shareholder rights. If continued, such practices will threaten both efficient
corporate control and development of financial markets. Here, the Russian authori-
ties have a role in strengthening laws, supervision, and the court system. As Johnson,
MacMillan, and Woodruff [2002] conclude from a survey covering a number of transi-
tion countries, weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits
even when bank credits are available.
Given the political fact that the Baltic Development Path is not open to Russia,
the conclusion must be that Russia still badly needs to increase the number and size of
its financial markets. It is not yet beyond the threshold. New markets are needed for
creating an environment for bank-based financial intermediation, but also for giving
firms a better possibility of market-based financing. Such need is particularly felt by
those SMEs that cannot realistically raise finance abroad. Additional markets are also
needed for additional monetary policy instruments, in particular for sterilization of
currency inflows that will tend to be unstable given Russia’s export structure and
expected increase of inward capital flows from very low current levels. Finally, addi-
tional markets are needed for underpinning necessary structural reform, ranging
from pension reform to mortgage markets and development of insurance. But at the
same time and perhaps even more so, there is a sore need to improve banking and
financial supervision, which together with improved property rights will be keys to
enhancing the efficiency of financial intermediation.279 FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the link between the banking sector and real GDP growth in
transition economies. We used a fixed-effects panel model and data from 25 transition
countries for the period 1993-2000. We used two variables to measure the level of
financial sector development. As the size of the financial sector in itself is not neces-
sarily a valid measure for financial sector development, we selected the interest rate
margin, which is closely linked to the theoretical models.
As expected, the interest rate margin is negatively and significantly associated
with economic growth. This result is consistent with theoretical models that find
banking sector efficiency important for economic growth. The outcome is the same for
both CEE and CIS countries. This has important policy implications: the interest rate
margin tends to shrink as reform in the financial sector advances.
Our second variable, the amount of bank credit allocated to the private sector,
apparently does not speed up economic growth in transition countries. Its lagged value
is even negatively related to economic growth and the causality between the growth
of credit and real GDP growth is unclear. This result contradicts many earlier results
and probably reflects the characteristics typical to transition economies, where the
growth of domestic credit was often unsustainable.
The results suggest two reasons that financial sector efficiency should not be
measured by sector size in the case of transition economies. First, the soft budget
constraints prevalent in many transition countries and credit to enterprises applying
soft budget constraints may lead to considerable losses in the economy when invest-
ments turn out to be counterproductive. Second, the negative link between the lagged
amount of credit and growth may reflect banking crises that many transition econo-
mies experienced during the research period. The increase in credit imposed consid-
erable costs in the wake of the crises in many banking sectors. Thus, the amount of
credit is probably not a valid measure of financial sector development in transition
countries.
Apparently, when the financial sector or the business environment is not ready
for growth in the amount of finance, growth in the amount of finance may be unsus-
tainable and do nothing to accelerate economic growth. In the worst case, such growth
in the amount of available finance may precipitate financial crises and harm economic
development.
Nevertheless, our results are in line with the theoretical models that indicate
that qualitative financial sector development accelerates economic growth. It would
be valuable, though, to test empirically the channels through which financial develop-
ment affects economic growth. Under the theoretical models we presented, these
channels might be growth in investments, productivity improvement, or an increase
in the savings rate. It would also be useful to clarify the relationship between foreign
direct investment and domestic debt. According to Krkoska [2001], foreign direct invest-
ment in transition countries supplements inadequate domestic resources in financing
ownership change and capital formation. One might ask if this is an efficient means of
finance or whether an efficient domestic financial market might after all be more
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Another useful extension of this study would be to include the equity markets into
the model. Although the equity and debt markets in transition economies are far from
developed and their role in financing limited, it would be interesting to clarify their
role in economic development. The number of countries might also be increased. As
mentioned above, the interest rate margin has not been used as a variable for finan-
cial development, so it might be interesting to see results for a larger group of coun-
tries. By doing so, we would supplement earlier papers that have largely ignored the
ways in which qualitative development of the financial sector influences economic
growth. From there, policy recommendations could be extended beyond transition
countries.
The Estonian case may seem a small and irrelevant one. However, to us it seems
to function as a useful reality check. Clearly, there are circumstances where not only
is small beautiful, but the lack of markets may permit making things that would
otherwise be (at least almost) impossible. One has, however, to be very careful in
making generalizations and, as the late Chinese Prime Minister once said, the time
may never come for us mortals to make final judgments.
APPENDIX 1. LIST OF THE COUNTRIES
Albania Georgia Romania
Armenia Hungary Russia




Czech Rep. Moldova Ukraine
Estonia Poland Uzbekistan*
FYR Macedonia
*Due to a lack of data, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are not included in
the regressions using the amount of credit.
 APPENDIX 2.  VARIABLES AND SOURCES
Variable Definition Source
Growth rate of GDP Real GDP EBRD Transition reports
Interest rate margin, INT Margin between deposit EBRD Transition reports
and lending rate
Credit to private sector, Credit to private sector from IFS, EBRD Transition reports
CREDIT deposit banks as a share of
production of private sector
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Appendix 2—Continued
Variable Definition Source
Reform index, RI Arithmetic average of EBRD EBRD Transition reports
transition indices (index of price
liberalization, index of forex and
trade liberalization, indices of
small- and large-scale privatization,
index of competition policy)
Inflation, INF Consumer price index EBRD Transition reports
Investments Gross domestic investment IFS
as a share of GDP
Exports Exports as a share of GDP IFS
Government Expenditure Government expenditure EBRD Transition reports
as a share of GDP
Growth rate of GDP Real GDP IFS
in OECD countries
NOTES
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACES/ASSA Annual Meetings, Washington,
D.C., 3-5 January 2003, and at the Symposium of Finnish Economists, Oulu, Finland, 6-7 February
2003. Useful comments from the meeting participants, especially Joseph Stiglitz and Ville Kaitila,
as well as from our colleagues, in particular Abdur Chowdhury, Pertti Haaparanta, and David
Lehrer are gratefully acknowledged. All opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.
1. The first is Koivu [2002], upon which this paper partially draws. The empirical section on Estonia
is based on Sutela [2002], and the discussion on Russia benefits from Komulainen et al. [2003].
2. The correlation rate between the banking reform index of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) and interest rate margin is –0.57.
3. Deposit and lending rates are unavailable for identical periods for each country. The overall size of
the margin, however, should not be affected significantly by lending/deposit periods. Moreover,
the differences in margins between and within countries are large, so a small error in the margins
should not disturb the results. The IMF has reported lending and deposit rates, but this informa-
tion is not available for all transition countries. Using the IMF data where possible, the results
correspond to the ones obtained with the EBRD data.
4. Actually, the discussion could easily be extended also to Latvia and Lithuania [Sutela, 2001] and
very probably to a comparison between Hungary and the Czech Republic.
5. This does not necessarily mean Sweden and Finland, the closest geographical neighbors, whose
welfare states were found to be beyond economic possibilities and probably faulty in their founda-
tions. The Baltics also did not try to develop independent defense capabilities like Sweden and
Finland, but aimed at becoming NATO members with a minimal amount of their own forces. It is
sometimes thought in Estonia that the time for debate on what kind of a market democracy the
country should become will only come after deep integration with Western Europe—naturally
constrained by the choices already made.
6. Some historians argue that the old Romans had something to do with this, as the property
arrangements of land were different in Northern and Southern Italy.
7. But again, some historians would point out that the river Elbe, separating Western and Eastern
Germany for decades, was also the Western border of serfdom in Europe.282 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
8. The recent growth in Russia has been based primarily on higher capacity utilization ratios, but
such growth can hardly continue. The average age of equipment in industry is reaching 20 years.
Capacity utilization ratios are already quite high in many industries [World Bank, 2002b].
9. A recent enterprise survey shows that, while barriers created by the public sector are the foremost
hindrance to SME development in Russia, capital access also remains a major problem. See Center
for Economic and Financial Research [2003].
10. For the IMF view see Barnard and Thomsen [2002] and for the Russian government view see
Ministry for Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation [2003].
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